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Comments
Extending Admiralty Jurisdiction over
Nonmaritime Property: Ascertaining the
Salvor's Possessory and Proprietary
Rights to Sunken Aircraft
In the last few years an increasing interest has emerged in the preser-
vation of World War I and II aircraft. These monuments of an un-
forgettable era are sought by numerous private collectors and museums
throughout the country.' Every possible source is being investigated
because demand for these aircraft far exceeds the supply available. 2
In reaction to this scarcity, professional salvors have turned to the
sea in search of these historical relics. 3
On August 11, 1983, after two years of extensive surveying and
research, a salvage crew pulled a mud-caked Navy Corsair fighter
plane4 out of the depths of Lake Washington near the Sand Point
Naval Air Station in Seattle, Washington.5 The Corsair was one of
six planes located by the salvage crew.6 This particular plane had sunk
1. Twenty-one museums are authorized by the Navy alone to display restored military
aircraft. Conversation with Gary Larkin, President of Air-Marine Salvage, Jan. 9, 1984 (notes
on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Conversation].
2. With respect to. Navy aircraft alone, 33 planes are requested by the 21 museums
authorized to display naval aircraft. See Conversation, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. Corsair has been defined as a pirate, a privateer, or a pirate ship. See WEBSTER's
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 513 (1971). The Navy began accepting shipments of
Corsairs in the early 1940's. The Corsair was designed primarily as a carrier fighter plane,
although many were flown from land bases. See B. TrwMAN, CoRsAiR, TIM F4U IN WoRLD
WAR II AND KOREA 7-8 (2nd ed. 1982). The plane can be distinguished by its collapsible or
bent wing. Id. at 3. The Corsair has a wing span of 41 feet; however, the span is reduced
to 17 feet when the wings are folded. The Corsair's length is a mere 33 feet and it stands
only 16 feet high. Other specifications include an empty weight of 9,205 pounds, an engine
rating of 2,000 h.p., a top speed of 446 miles per hour at 26,200 feet, and a cruise speed
of 215 miles per hour. The Corsair has a range of 1,005 statute miles and boasts a standard
armament of six .50 caliber machine guns and eight 5-inch rockets. As of 1974, a total of
62 Corsairs (including F4Us, FGs, F2Gs, and AUs) were known to exist. As of 1978, 15 Cor-
sairs were licensed as airworthy. Id. at 196.
5. Seattle Times, Aug. 11, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
6. See Conversation, supra note 1.
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approximately 300 yards offshore shortly after it crashed on Lake
Washington on July 29, 1950, following a midair collision.'
Despite having spent thirty-three years 150 feet below the surface
of the lake, the single-seat FG-1D was in remarkable condition.'
Salvage crews worked unceasingly for a week carefully raising the
sunken aircraft from its marinal resting place.9 For Air Marine Salvage,
the California firm responsible for the discovery and subsequent salvage
of the aircraft, however, the two year salvage operation was plagued
with setbacks and bureaucratic intervention.'" Air Marine Salvage now
must confront a number of legal problems.
Although the six planes in Lake Washington have rested on the
bottom of the lake for nearly forty years and appear to have been
abandoned, the Navy asserts that it has retained ownership of the
aircraft." Consequently, the Navy has assumed complete control over
the salvage, restoration, and relocation of the sunken aircraft. 2 If
the need arises, the Navy asserts that it will enjoin the salvage of
the airplane.' 3
The resistance displayed by the Navy typifies the perplexity faced
by salvors who seek to rescue sunken aircraft. Generally, salvors of
sunken aircraft confront three distinct legal problems. First, the salvor
must ascertain objectively whether the sunken property has been
abandoned." This distinction ultimately will affect the rights to title
of the aircraft.' 5 Under the maritime law of finds, most courts grant
title to the salvor of lost, abandoned, or derelict property.' 6 If aban-
donment cannot be shown, however, the salvor merely holds possessory
rights subject to the superior rights of the owner. Inclusive in these
possessory rights is a maritime lien that entitles the salvor to a salvage
award as compensation for services rendered in preserving the
property.' Second, if the sunken property is located within the ter-
7. Seattle Times, Aug. 13, 1983, at A5, col. 1; Times, supra note 5, at Al, col. I.
8. See Times, supra note 5, at Al, col. 1.
9. Id. at Al, col. 3.
10. See Conversation, supra note 1.
11. Times, supra note 5, at Al, col. 1.
12. Id.; see also Correspondence between Department of the Navy and Admiral Holloway,
Ret., President of the Association of Naval Aviation, Inc. (this letter dealt with the disposition
of two of the planes located in Lake Washington, the provisions of the salvage arrangement
with Air-Marine, and a waiver of liability) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
13. See Conversation, supra note 1. In Michigan, for example, the Navy had the salvor
of a sunken airplane recovered from Lake Michigan arrested and imprisoned by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for stealing United States government property. Id.
14. See infra notes 42-64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 173-224 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 175-206 and accompanying text.
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ritorial boundaries of the state, the state may assert superior rights
to title based upon statute or British Crown prerogatives inherited
by the state in its capacity as a sovereign.'" Since few cases dealing
with sunken aircraft have been reported, this issue has not arisen in
the present context. Salvors of sunken vessels, however, have been
faced with intervention by states on these grounds.'9 Eventually, salvors
of aircraft sunken within the boundaries of a state will have to face
this problem. Third, the federal government has also asserted superior
rights to abandoned property brought to shore by American citizens. 20
This problem is compounded when the abandoned property original-
ly belonged to the United States Government. 2' Allegedly, the salvor
must present stronger evidence of abandonment when federal prop-
erty is at issue than when the property had been held privately.22
A distinct legal problem is faced by salvors of sunken aircraft. To
apply the maritime doctrine of salvage and the law of finds, aircraft
must fit within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court. 23 If
the court determines that aircraft have no place in admiralty law,
the rights of the salvor necessarily will be governed by common-law
principles of abandonment and lost property.2"
The uncertainty in this area of the law has confounded salvors seek-
ing to recover aircraft sunken at sea. To avoid legal pitfalls, they
have refrained from pursuing salvage operations that otherwise would
have contributed to the preservation of historical relics of great
significance. The purpose of this comment is to discuss the relevant
legal problems confronted by salvors of sunken aircraft and clarify
the remedies available to salvors who engage in the beneficient activity
of recovering historic property lost at sea. The legal rights to aban-
doned property are well established in the common law. 25 When per-
sonality has been abandoned, ownership or title to the property rests
in the person who first lawfully appropriates and reduces it to possesn.
18. See infra notes 225-51 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 225-73 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 274-85 and accompanying text. This potential problem is evidenced
by the recent action taken by the State of Alaska. The United States Air Force expressly has
manifested that it no longer holds title to aircraft that have been wrecked, lost, or abandoned
for a period exceeding five years, nor does it assert the right to pass title to these aircraft.
See Conversation, supra note 1. In response to this manifestation, the State of Alaska has
declared over 100 abandoned airplanes stranded on the Aleutian Islands off the coast of Alaska
to be state historical monuments. Id. Alaska claims a possessory right or title to these planes
as a prerogative of the state in its sovereign capacity. Id.
21. See infra notes 286-301 and accompanying text.
22: See infra notes 286-99 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 95-172 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 42-94 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
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sion with the intent to become its owner.26 If the property merely
has been lost, rather than abandoned, the finder, through adherence
to provisions under statutory law, may obtain title to the lost goods
under certain circumstances. 2 This comment will demonstrate that
these doctrines of abandonment and lost property may provide viable
remedies for one who discovers and rescues sunken aircraft. 28
The author will focus primarily upon the rights under admiralty
law of the finder of abandoned aircraft. 29 Although adequate common-
law remedies are available, maritime doctrines provide much more
advantageous remedies to the salvor.3" To apply these more desirable
remedies under the maritime law of salvage, courts must recognize
sunken land-based aircraft as objects subject to the admiralty jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts.3' This author will assert that the Supreme
Court holding in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, which
excludes aircraft from admiralty jurisdiction, is limited to cases in-
volving aviation tort claims, and consequently, is not controlling 2
for purposes of salvage. In determining admiralty jurisdiction, courts
should not be constrained to a categorization of the object salved
as "maritime in nature," but rather should consider whether the prop-
erty has been lost in navigable waters from which it was salved for
the benefit of its owner.33 After establishing that sunken aircraft are
proper objects of admiralty courts, this author will suggest that two
alternative remedies are present for the finder of sunken aircraft, one
based on a reward for salvage services3 4 and one based on the ac-
quisition of title under the maritime law of finds." A discussion will
be included regarding any superior rights to title of sunken aircraft
possessed by the state36 and federal governments,37 either by statute
or by common-law crown prerogatives in their sovereign capacities. 8
The greatest demand for the preservation of aircraft lies in vintage
war planes; therefore, this author will emphasize the application of
the law to aircraft specifically owned, or once owned, by the United
States Government.
26. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 42-94 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 95-224 and accompanying text.
30. See id.
31. See infra notes 95-172 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 139-72 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 103-72 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 173-206 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 225-73 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 274-301 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 225-301 and accompanying text.
1984 / Salvor's Right to Sunken Aircraft
A discussion of the common-law principle of abandonment will be
necessary for an adequate resolution of the salvor's problem.39 For
the salvor to obtain title to the sunken aircraft under the maritime
law of finds, a determination first must be made that the aircraft
was abandoned by the owner." In addition, if the court later deter-
mines that an airplane is not a proper subject of the admiralty jurisdic-
tion of the court, the salvor will be forced to seek an alternative remedy
under the common law of abandonment.' This comment, therefore,
will begin with an examination of the common-law doctrine of
abandonment.
COMMON-LAW DOCTRINE OF ABANDONMENT
Abandonment is the intentional relinquishment of property.42 An
owner abandons an airplane by voluntarily giving up the property
because he no longer desires to possess it or to assert any right or
dominion over it. Moreover, the owner must be entirely indifferent
to what may become of the aircraft or who may possess it thereafter. 3
The essential elements of abandonment are the intention to abandon
and the external act by which the abandonment is carried into effect.4
To constitute an abandonment at law, these two elements must
concur.4 5 Importantly, the question of abandonment turns on intent
as determined in light of all the circumstances.46
Relinquishment of the aircraft must be voluntary. The owner must
form the intent to abandon the aircraft without being pressed by any
duty, necessity, or utility to himself, but simply because he no longer
desires to own the craft. 7 Consequently, when an airplane has crashed
at sea, the act of vacating the craft by parachuting to safety and
allowing it to sink to the bottom, or some other apparent act of aban-
donment would be insufficient to constitute an actual abandonment.
This type of relinquishment is not voluntary; rather, it is created by
necessity. Subsequent acts and circumstances, however, may be suffi-
cient to constitute an abandonment of that same airplane.
Abandonment may arise when, after a casual and unintentional loss,
39. See infra notes 42-65 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 212-24 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 225-301 and accompanying text.
42. Nippon Shosen Kaisha, K.K. v. U.S., 238 F. Supp. 55, 58 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
43. Martin v. Cassidy, 149 Cal. App. 2d 106, 110, 307 P.2d 981, 984 (1957).
44. City of Los Angeles v. Abbott, 129 Cal. App. 144, 148, 18 P.2d 785, 787 (1933).
45. Wood v. Etiwanda Water Co., 147 Cal. 228, 234, 81 P. 512, 514 (1905).
46. BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY, §1.6, at 8 (3rd Ed. 1975).
47. Stephans v. Mansfield, 11 Cal. 363, 366 (1858).
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all further purpose to seek and reclaim the lost property is forsaken.48
A federal district court held, in Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less,
of Italian Marble,"9 that while lapse of time and nonusel ° are insuffi-
cient in and of themselves to constitute an abandonment, these fac-
tors may, under certain circumstances, give rise to an implication of
an intent to abandon. 5' In Wiggins, a derelict vessel and cargo had
remained for sixty-six years in the exact location where the vessel had
sunk on the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean.52 The court concluded
that while abandonment is essentially a question of fact, in this case
only one inference could be drawn: the vessel and its cargo had long
since been voluntarily abandoned." The facts that the court considered
in determining abandonment were not the circumstances surrounding
the sinking of the vessel, but were instead the acts and conduct of
the owner subsequent to the wreck that evidenced an intention to aban-
don the vessel."4
According to a well-settled principle, when personalty is abandoned,
ownership of the property is lost." The court in Wiggins noted that
personalty, after abandonment, ceases to be the property of any
person.56 Accordingly, the personalty may be appropriated by anyone,
and ownership of it rests, by operation of law, in the first person
who, with the intent to become the owner, lawfully appropriates and
reduces the personalty to possession." Once abandoned property has
been appropriated by another, the former owner cannot reclaim it."
An owner of personalty such as an airplane, therefore, may abandon
the craft by relinquishing possession of it with the intent to divest
himself of ownership.
In determining whether the FG-1D Navy Corsair fighter had been
48. BROWN, supra note 46, §1.6, at 8.
49. 186 F. Supp. 452 (1960).
50. Nonuse is a circumstance to be taken into consideration on the question of intention
to abandon. More specifically, nonuse is evidence of abandonment, and its weight is propor-
tionate to its duration. See Home Real Estate Co. v. Los Angeles Pac. Co., 163 Cal. 710,
714, 126 P. 972, 973 (1912). Lapse of time, or delay in asserting a right, is closely associated
with nonuse. Like nonuse, lapse of time does not in itself constitute abandonment, but is a
material element to be considered in connection therewith. See Lawrence v. Fulton, 19 Cal.
683, 690-91 (1862). The probative force of lapse of time and nonuse may be rebutted by facts
and circumstances explaining the inaction and showing that the owner did not intend to aban-
don the thing or right. See Utt v. Frey, 106 Cal. 392, 398, 39 P. 807, 809 (1895).
51. Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452, 456 (1960).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 456.
54. Id.
55. See Collins v. Lewis, 149 A. 668, 669 (1930).
56. Wiggins, 186 F. Supp. at 456.
57. Id.
58. Nippon, 238 F. Supp. at 59; see Wiggins, 186 F. Supp. at 456.
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abandoned, a court would be required to look objectively at all of
the facts and circumstances of the case." Relinquishment of the Cor-
sair is not evidenced necessarily by the fact that the Navy stood by
and watched as the plane sank to the bottom. This relinquishment
was created by necessity rather than intent. The failure of the Navy
to retrieve the Corsair, or to make any efforts to do so, however,
may be sufficient to show relinquishment.6" Intent to abandon, in
this case, is evidenced by a number of facts including the following:
(1) the location of the crash was known to the Navy,61 (2) the plane
rested only 300 yards offshore from the Naval Air Station, 62 (3) no
efforts were made to salvage the plane, 63 (4) thirty-three years had
elapsed since the sinking," and (5) the Navy had stricken the serial
number of the plane from its records. 65
In summary, upon examining the totality of the circumstances, a
court could determine that the Navy fighter had been abandoned.
In some cases the salvor has extreme difficulty in discerning whether
the aircraft has been abandoned by the owner or merely lost. If a
determination is made that the Corsair had been lost, rather than
abandoned, a different body of law would apply. A comparison of
these two distinct legal principles necessarily must follow to ascertain
the common-law rights of the salvor of sunken aircraft.
THE SALVOR's RIGHTS TO LOST PROPERTY
Whether the property is abandoned or lost, the result may be prac-
tically the same. In some instances, however, the differences between
loss and abandonment will be vital to the original owner and the finder
or the new possessor.67 Property is abandoned when it is discarded,
or when ownership is voluntarily forsaken by the owner. In the case
of abandonment, the plane will become the property of the first oc-
cupant with title good against the original owner. 61 Property that is
involuntarily lost or left by the owner without the hope and expecta-
tion of again acquiring it, however, becomes the property of the finder,
subject to the superior rights of the owner. 69
59. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
60. See id.
61. See Times, supra note 7, at A5, col. 1.
62. See Times, supra note 5, at Al, col. 1.
63. See id.
64. See Times, supra note 7, at A5, col. 1.
65. See Conversation, supra note 1.
66. Abbott, 129 Cal. App. at 148, 18 P.2d at 787.
67. Id.
68. Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 509 (1861).
69. Id. at 509; see also BROWN, supra note 46, §3.1, at 24. In salvage cases under ad-
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If a plane crashes and the location of the wreck is unknown to
the owner, the finder of that plane would have rights to possession,
subject to the superior right of the owner. Moreover, upon assuming
dominion and control of the plane, the finder attains the status of
a quasi-bailee. 70 Once the finder takes the aircraft into his custody,
he assumes the obligations of a gratuitous bailee and may be liable
for negligence in keeping the plane,7' or for conversion by failing
to return the craft to the rightful owner upon demand.72 If the finder
knows or has a reasonable means of discovering the owner, but
feloniously appropriates the plane to his own use, he is guilty of
larceny." Many jurisdictions have statutes that require certain notice
and other procedures to be followed by finders of lost property.
74
In California, title to lost property is governed by statute."
ACQUISITION OF TITLE THROUGH COMPLIANCE WITH
CALIFORNIA STATUTORY PROVISIONS
California has enacted various statutes that specify the rights and
duties of a finder of lost goods. 76 The finder of a plane lost within
the territorial jurisdiction7 7 of the State of California is required to
comply with the statutory law governing lost property, rather than
the common law. In California, the finder of a lost plane is not bound
to take charge of it, but if he elects to do so, he becomes a bailee,
with the rights and obligations of a bailee for hire. 78 The finder is
statutorily required to inform the owner, if known, within a reasonable
time, and return the property to the owner. 79 The finder receives no
miralty law, however, the finder may hold possession until he is paid his compensation, or
until the property is submitted to legal jurisdiction for the ascertainment of the compensation.
Eads, 22 Ark. at 509.
70. See BROWN, supra note 46, §3.5, at 30; see also Burns v. State, 128 N.W. 987, 990
(Wis. 1910); CAL. CIV. CODE §1864.
71. BROWN, supra note 46, §3.5, at 30; see Dougherty v. Posegate, 3 Iowa 88, 91 (1856);
Joy v. Crawford, 154 S.W. 357, 358 (1913). On duties of bailee generally, see BROWN, supra
note 46, at 252-318.
72. See BROWN, supra note 46, at §3.5, at 30; see also Ray v. Light, 34 Ark. 421, 427
(1879); Ryan v. Chown, 125 N.W. 46, 46 (Mich. 1910).
73. BROWN, supra note 46, §3.5, at 30; see also Burns v. State, 128 N.W. 987, 990 (Wis.
1910).
74. BROWN, supra note 46, §3.5, at 31.
75. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§2080-2080.9.
76. See id.
77. The territory of the State of California extends one marine league or three English
nautical miles off the coast. CAL. Gov'T CODE §170.
78. Id. §2080. A finder who is trespassing can obtain no rights as a finder to possession
of property unlawfully removed from the premises of another. Bishop v. Ellsworth, 234 N.E.2d
49, 52 (Ill. 1968).
79. CAL. CrV. CODE §2080. A bailee for hire is subject to a greater standard of care for
negligence in taking care of the property than is a mere gratuitous bailee. Compare CAL. Civ.
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compensation,80 except for the payment of a reasonable amount for
saving8 and taking care of the aircraft. 82 Prior statutory law in Califor-
nia permitted the finder to place a lien on the aircraft.8 3 The finder
then could sell the property if the owner refused to pay the lawful
charges of the finder, provided the finder's charges amounted to two-
thirds of the value of the property. 4 Current law, however, merely
conditions restitution of the property to the owner upon the payment
of all reasonable charges,85 and is silent as to whether the finder is
entitled to a lien8" for his services.8 7
According to statutory law in California, if the owner is unknown
or has not claimed the aircraft, the finder is required to turn the
property over to the local police authorities.88 If the owner appears
within ninety days, proves his ownership of the aircraft, and pays
CODE §1846 with id. §1852. See BROWN, supra note 46, §11-1, at 256. Under the common
law, a finder of lost property attains the status of a gratuitous bailee rather than a bailee
for hire. Id. §3.5, at 30. A bailee for hire must exercise at least ordinary care in the preserva-
tion of the article deposited. CAL. CiV. CODE §1852. Ordinary care means that the bailee is
liable for ordinary negligence. BROWN, supra note 46, §11-1, at 257. Ordinary care requires
the bailee to exercise the degree of care that persons of ordinary prudence customarily take
of their own goods of similar kind and under similar circumstances. Id. §11-1, at 258. A gratuitous
bailee, however, is required only to exercise slight care. CAL. CIV. CODE §1846. Compare id.
with id. §1852. Slight care means that the bailee is liable when he is guilty of gross negligence.
BROWN, supra note 46, §11-1, at 257.
80. Under the common law, a finder may recover a reasonable compensation for services
in securing and caring for the lost article. See BROWN, supra note 46, §3.5, at 31. This was
premised on the notion that an implied request exists from the owner to all other persons
to endeavor to return to him lost property which he is anxious to retrieve. Id. Therefore, the
owner should at least indemnify any person that contributes, by the expenditure of time or
money, to a reclamation of the lost property. Id. See also Reeder v. Anderson's Adm'rs, 34
Ky. (4 Dana) 193, 193 (1836). Prior law in California granted the finder an entitlement to
compensation for all expenses incurred and to a reasonable reward for keeping the lost article.
Compare CAL. Civ. CODE §2080 with 1872 Stat. of Cal. (enacting CAL. Cirv. CODE §1867) (repealed
by 1967 Cal. Stat. c. 1512, §1, at 3601).
81. This appears to be closely analogous to a salvor's right to reasonable compensation
under the maritime law of salvage. See infra notes 140-60 and accompanying text.
82. CAL. CIv. CODE §2080.
83. See Stat. of Cal. (enacting CAL. CIv. CODE §1869) (repealed by 1967 Cal. Stat. c.
1512, §1, at 3601).
84. Id.
85. See CAL. Crv. CODE §§2080, 2080.2.
86. Under the common law, the finder is not entitled to a lien for his services on the
rationale that a lien might tempt unscrupulous persons to bring about the loss of goods so
that they might be paid for finding them. See BROWN, supra note 46, §3.5, at 31. This argu-
ment is deficient in the sense that the same rationale would seem to support disallowance of
any claim for the finder's services. Id.
87. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§2080-2080.9. Under the status of a bailee for hire, however,
the finder is entitled to payment for the storage of the retrieved property during any fraction
of a half month. Id. §1853. Moreover, a bailee for hire is entitled to a lien to enforce payment
for storage charges. Id. §1856.
88. CAL. CIV. CODE §2080.1. "Local police authorities" refers to the police if the proper-
ty is found within the city limits or the sheriff if the property is found outside of the city
limits. Id. This requirement applies only if the property is worth $10 or more. Id. The finder
also is required to make an affidavit particularly describing the property, and stating when
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all reasonable charges, 9 the police will return the aircraft to him. 9"
If the owner fails to appear or prove ownership of the aircraft within
the ninety day period, the police will publish notice of the lost air-
craft at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.9' If the owner
still does not claim the aircraft after seven days following the first
publication of notice, title to the aircraft will vest in the finder. 92
In summary, California law provides that a finder of lost aircraft
may obtain possession to the craft, subject only to the superior rights
of the owner. Depending upon the applicable state statutes, the finder
may obtain absolute title to the lost aircraft, but only after compliance
with a considerable amount of red tape and statutory procedure. If
the aircraft is found in navigable waters, 93 however, it may be con-
sidered an object subject to admiralty jurisdiction, governed by unique
maritime doctrines under the law of salvage.
Comparatively, the law of salvage portends a better result for the
salvor than that which is available under the common-law principles
of abandonment and lost property. The maritime law of salvage grants
the salvor an award for raising the sunken aircraft. The salvage award
is secured by a maritime lien on the salved aircraft. 9 Moreover, if
the property is deemed lost, abandoned, or derelict, the maritime law
of finds may supplement the law of salvage, enabling the salvor to
obtain title by reducing the sunken aircraft to possession.95 To benefit
from these more favorable maritime remedies, the salvor must seek
admiralty jurisdiction in the federal courts.
EXTENSION OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION TO AIRCRAFT
Clearly, the owners of sunken or derelict vessels or their contents
may abandon them so effectively as to divest title and ownership. 6
and where the property was found or saved. Id. If the property was saved, the finder must
state: (1) from what and how it was saved; (2) whether the owner of the property is known
to him; and (3) that he has not secreted, withheld, or disposed of any part of the property. Id.
89. See supra note 85, and accompanying text.
90. CA.. CIV. CODE §2080.2.
91. Id. §2080.3(a). If the value of the property is less than $50, no publication of notice
is required for title to vest in the finder. Id. §2080.3(b).
92. Id. §2080.3(a). The vesting of title is conditioned upon two minor factors: (1) the
finder must pay the cost of publication; and (2) the finder must not have found the property
in the course of his employment as an employee of a public agency. Id.
93. A body of water is navigable in law when it is navigable-in-fact. In other words, the
water must be capable of being used by the public as a highway for transportation and com-
merce. Baldwin v. Erie Shooting Club, 87 N.W. 59, 60 (Mich. 1901).
94. See infra notes 175-206 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 206-23 and accompanying text.
96. State v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 160 S.E.2d 482, 488 (1968); see, e.g., Eads,
22 Ark. at 499; see also supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
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This doctrine is established under the maritime law of finds, 97 which
is an adjunct to the maritime law of salvage."8 Apparently, for the
law of finds to apply, the aircraft first must be categorized as prop-
erty subject to a salvage award. Ample authority exists, both American
and English, that property subject to a salvage award is limited to
a ship or cargo or goods coming from a ship.9 9 The modern trend
of authority, however, appears to have departed from this rigid limita-
tion by focusing on the location of the property at the time of rescue
rather than relying upon the characterization of the object salved.
This modern standard of analysis is commonly referred to as the
"locality" or "situs of the rescue" test.
ACCEPTANCE OF THE LOCALITY TEST
In 1887, the United States Supreme Court held in Cope v. Vallette
Dry Dock Co.' that services rendered to a floating drydock per-
manently moored to the shore were not compensable by a salvage
award."0' The Court avoided expressing an opinion regarding older
case law that required the property to be maritime in nature. The
Court merely observed that when salved property las no connection
with a ship "some authorities are against the claim, and others are
in favor of it." ' 2 The more recent American cases, however, suggest
that anything rescued from navigable waters, without regard to the
nature of the property, or how it got there, will be considered
salvageable.' In Maltby v. Steam Derrick Boat,"4 the court deter-
mined that any property of value could be the subject of salvage pro-
vided that it was salved in navigable waters. 05 Judge Hughes stated:
I think the test as to what is the subject of salvage is no longer,
whether it is a vessel engaged in commerce or its cargo or furniture,
but whether the thing saved is a movable thing, possessing the at-
tributes of property, susceptible to being lost and saved in places
within the local jurisdiction of the admiralty.10 6
Martin J. Norris, a noted authority on the law of salvage, is in accord
97. See Cobb Coin v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp.
186, 198 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
98. See Treasure Salvors v. Unidentified Wrecked, Etc., 569 F.2d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1978)
[hereinafter referred to as Treasure Salvors 1].
99. M. NORRIS, 3A BENEDICT ON ADbuRALTY: TM LAW OF SALVAGE, §32, at 3-1 (7th Ed.
1980).
100. 119 U.S. 625 (1887).
101. Id. at 627.
102. Id. at 629-30.
103. GmioRE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADmRALTY, §8-3, at 448 (1957).
104. 16 Fed. Cas. 564, (D.Va. 1879) (No. 9000).
105. Id. at 566.
106. Id.
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with this view.1"7 Norris points out the difficulty in reconciling the
beneficient maritime policy of rewarding the rescuer of property at
sea, with the "hair-splitting" distinction based upon the "maritime
in nature" characterization of the distressed property.," Moreover,
the proper test of admiralty jurisdiction should not end with a rigid
characterization of the object salved as property closely related to
a seagoing vessel.' 9 An analysis of modern case law indicates that
for purposes of salvage, admiralty jurisdiction should be extended
to all property susceptible of being lost and saved upon navigable
waters.
The introduction of aircraft complicated the issue of determining
the breadth of the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Although
aircraft apparently may be considered property subject to admiralty
jurisdiction under the Maltby locality test, courts initially were reluc-
tant to apply this test to aircraft. Gradually, however, courts
acknowledged the applicability of the Maltby locality test to aircraft
wrecked at sea.
APPLICATION OF THE MALTBY LOCALITY TEST
Soon after Wilbur and Orville Wright's epoch-making flight at Kitty
Hawk, the question whether aircraft lost at sea could be the subject
of salvage was raised."' In 1913, an airplane that had fallen into
the waters of Puget Sound was salved and pulled ashore. The salvor
filed a libel in admiralty, asserting a salvage lien on the plane.1 ' In
what has been criticized as a rather unsatisfactory opinion,' 2 the court
declined to take the case because of the absence of legislation confer-
ring admiralty jurisdiction.' Moreover, the court declared that air-
craft are neither of the land nor sea, and because they are not of
the sea or restricted in their activities to navigable waters, they are
not maritime.'"
Seven years later, Judge Cardozo suggested in dictum that a
seaplane may be considered a vessel'" for the purposes of sal-
107. NORRIS, supra note 99, §34, at 3-4.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 F. 269, 269. (W.D. Wash. 1914); see also NORRIS,
supra note 99, §38, at 3-11.
111. Crawford Bros., 215 F. at 269.
112. See NoRRIs, supra note 99, §38, at 3-11.
113. Crawford Bros., 215 F. at 271.
114. Id.
115. No doubt exists that an imperiled vessel on navigable waters is a proper subject of
salvage. NoRIs, supra note 99, §35, at 3.5. For the purposes of marine salvage, the term
"vessel" includes a craft of every kind and description used or capable of being navigated
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vage."16 Judge Cardozo limited this proposition to situations in which
the seaplane moves upon the water, becomes disabled, and then is
rescued upon the high seas by a passing ship." 7 Three decades later,
this hypothetical situation materialized in Lambros Seaplane Base, Inc.
v. The Batory."ts The S.S. Batory, a Polish transatlantic passenger
liner, approximately fifty miles from New York en route to Sout-
hampton, England, sighted a seaplane that proceeded to circle the
ship from five to twenty times.'" 9 While circling the ship, the pilot
of the plane shouted that he was lost and without gas or compass. 20
On direction of the master of the Batory, the pilot landed the plane,
the engines of the Batory were stopped, the pilot was rescued, and
the plane was hoisted on board.' 21 In concluding that a seaplane, when
of the sea, is a marine object subject to the maritime law of salvage,
the court stressed that the underlying policy of the law to encourage
salvage applies to seaplanes as well as to the other types of vessels
long recognized under admiralty law. 122 Moreover, the court in Lam-
bros noted the "highly reputable concensus of thought" expressed
in two separate international conventions on aviation and admiralty.'2 3
These international delegations asserted that the salvage of aircraft'24
wrecked at sea should be regulated, in the absence of any agreement
to the contrary, by the principles of maritime law. 12
Only one reported case has held that a seaplane was not a marine
object subject to the maritime law of salvage.' 26 This British deci-
sion, however, was criticized severely and promptly overruled by the
British Air Navigation Act of 1920,127 which expressly extended the
law of salvage to aircraft on or over the sea or tidal waters. 2 ' At
or used on water and for the purposes of commerce and transportation. Id. Aside from the
usual types of crafts such as a freighter and passenger ships, sail and steam, tramps and liners
(and in addition to seaplanes), the following have been held to be vessels subject to salvage:
scows, barges, tugs, ferries, sunken vessels, canal boats, fishing boats, a bath house, submarines,
wrecks, public vessels, derrick boat, lightships, destroyer, and a dismantled ship. Id. at 3-6.
116. Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 118, 133 N.E. 371, 372 (1921).
117. See id; see also NoRms, supra note 99, at §35.
118. 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954).
119. Id. at 230.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 233.
123. Id.
124. One noted authority, relying on the dictum in Lambros, was of the opinion that
salvageability of aircraft at sea would apply regardless of the type of aircraft involved. GrIMoRE
& BLACK, supra note 103, at 450.
125. Lambros, 215 F.2d at 233.
126. Id. at 232.
127. See id.
128. Id.
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least a seaplane, therefore, would be considered an object properly
fitting within the realm of the admiralty jurisdiction of the court.
In a 1978 decision, Mark v. South Continental Ins. Agency, Inc.,1
29
a federal district court finally addressed the extension of admiralty
jurisdiction to land-based aircraft in the context of salvage. The Mark
court determined admiralty jurisdiction through an application of the
Maltby locality test.'30 Prior to 1972, several federal courts applied
the Maltby locality test in granting admiralty jurisdiction over land-
based aircraft in wrongful death actions initiated under the Death
on the High Seas Act.' In 1972, however, the United States Supreme
Court in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland rejected the ap-
plicability of the locality test to aviation tort cases involving land-
based aircraft.' 32 An analysis of Executive Jet and its progeny
demonstrates that, in granting admiralty jurisdiction, the underlying
policy of the salvage award forcefully serves to distinguish aircraft
involved in aviation tort actions from aircraft as objects of a salvage
award.
EXTENSION OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION:
AERONAUTICAL TORT ACTIONS INVOLVING LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT
Admiralty jurisdiction originally was extended to land-based air-
craft for wrongful death actions brought pursuant to the Death on
the High Seas Act.'33 Jurisdiction later was extended beyond actions
for death on the high seas to personal injury actions resulting from
aircraft crashes occurring on the high seas.' 34 The final jurisdictional
expansion by courts involved an airplane crash within state territorial
waters. In Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines,'" the court affirmed ad-
miralty jurisdiction based upon a strict adherence to the "locality"
129. 1978 A.M.C. 519.
130. Id. at 520.
131. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
132. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 261 (1972).
133. Choy v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 1941 A.M.C. 483, 484 (S.D.N.Y.); see 46 U.S.C.
§§761-68 (1976). Section 761 provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State .
. . the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in
the district courts of the United States, in admiralty ...
Id. §761.
134. See Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, 244 F. Supp. 874, 877 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Hor-
ton v. J&L Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120, 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966); see Note, Aircraft as Vessels
under the Jones Act and General Maritime Law, 22 S. TEx. L.J. 595, 598 (1981).
135. 316 F.2d 758 (3rd Cir. 1963).
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test,'36 even though the aircraft flight was not a transoceanic crossing. 7
Weinstein was the forerunner of several aviation tort decisions that
based admiralty jurisdiction upon a holding that an airplane was a
vessel in the maritime sense of the word.' 38
The validity of the "locality" test to determine the extension of
admiralty jurisdiction to aircraft was presented to the United States
Supreme Court in Executive Jet.'39 In 1968, a private jet struck a
flock of seagulls as it was taking off from an airport situated directly
adjacent to Lake Erie. The ingestion of the seagulls caused an im-
mediate loss of power. As a result, the plane crashed and ultimately
sank in the navigable waters of Lake Erie. The question presented
to the Supreme Court in this landmark case was whether the damage
to the aircraft should fall within the realm of admiralty.""' The Court
held that admiralty law was not applicable.''
In arriving at the conclusion that the crash of the airplane into
Lake Erie did not give rise to admiralty jurisdiction, the Court dis-
cussed in detail the difficulties presented in "aeronautical tort
actions." 42 The Court noted that aircraft, unlike waterborne vessels,
are not restrained by one-dimensional geographic and physical
boundaries. 4 3 Moreover, in flights principally over land, the fact that
an aircraft happens to fall in navigable waters rather than on land
is "wholly fortuitous."" For the next of kin of the passengers to
expect anything other than the ordinary state court remedies makes
little sense.' 45 The Court concluded that simply because the alleged
tort "occurs" or "is located" on or over navigable waters of itself,
is insufficient to transform an airplane negligence case into a maritime
tort.'4 6 Moreover, the Court held that to require, that the wrong bear
a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity in addition
136. Prior to 1972, the locality test was the traditional test employed to invoke admiralty
jurisdiction, based upon the locality of the occurrence. See Note, supra note 134, at 597. See
also supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
137. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 316 F.2d 758, 765 (1963).
138. Id.; see also Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 1970); Scott v.
Eastern Airlines, 399 F.2d 14, 22 (3rd Cir. 1968). For a brief discussion on vessels, see note
115 and accompanying text.
139. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
140. Id. at 250-51.
141. Id. at 274.
142. Id. at 261-68.
143. Id. at 268.
144. Id. at 266.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 268.
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to locality on or over navigable waters, is far more consistent with
the history and purpose of admiralty law."4 7 The Court refused to
decide whether, in the absence of legislation, an aviation tort case
could ever bear a sufficient maritime nexus to come within admiralty
jurisdiction.' 8 The Court noted, however, that an argument could
be made that a maritime nexus exists, especially if the aircraft is engag-
ed in a transoceanic crossing.' 4 9
In subsequent cases dealing with the inclusion of aircraft in ad-
miralty law, courts have been reluctant to accept the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Executive Jet that the laws of admiralty were de-
signed and developed to regulate only seagoing vessels and have "no
conceivable bearing on the operation of aircraft . . .over land or
water.""'5 Purporting to stay within the holding of Executive Jet that
the aircraft bear a significant relationship to maritime commerce, courts
have allowed aircraft involved in tort actions to be covered under
admiralty law. II
In Ledoux v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.,1 2 a federal district court
held that the crash of a helicopter being used in place of a vessel
to ferry personnel and supplies to and from offshore drilling struc-
tures bears the type of significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity required by Executive Jet to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.,
One year later, in a similar case involving the crash of a helicopter,
the court, in Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.," 4 significantly
expanded the role of aircraft to the very heart of admiralty law. The
court found that a helicopter specifically designed for landings,
takeoffs, and movement on water, used to transport personnel to and
from an oil drilling platform, was engaged in a maritime endeavor
and constituted a vessel'" within the meaning of the general maritime
147. Id.
148. See id. at 271.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 270.
151. See Ledoux v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 609 F.2d 824, 824 (5th Cir. 1980); Barger
v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1199, 1206-07 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
152. 609 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1980).
153. Id. The court interpreted Executive Jet as holding that admiralty jurisdiction required
not only maritime situs, but also maritime status, i.e., a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity. Id.
154. 514 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
155. For a discussion on vessels, see supra note 115 and accompanying text. No doubt
exists that an imperiled vessel on navigable waters (either on or below the surface, or after
having been driven ashore) receiving services is a proper subject of salvage. See NoRMs, supra
note 99, §35, at 3-5.
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law.' 56 Barger used a three-prong test to determine whether the air-
craft constituted a vessel. The test includes the following elements:
(1) the purpose for which the craft was constructed,'57 (2) the business
in which the craft was engaged,"5 8 and (3) the extent to which the
craft was subjected to the risk and exposure from the hazards of the
sea. 
59
Many government aircraft, such as the FG-1D Corsair owned by
the Navy, should constitute vessels under the Barger test. Naval air-
craft, for example, are constructed for the purpose of transporting
personnel and supplies over water. In fact, the Corsair pulled out
of Lake Washington was built with a carrier hook to enable it to
land and takeoff from mobile aircraft carriers.16 Moreover, when
Navy aircraft are in operation, they are primarily engaged in maritime
activities; that is, transportation across navigable waters. Finally, when
a Navy plane malfunctions while travelling over the sea, the pilot and
passengers stand a far greater chance of losing their lives in the mishap
than their counterparts aboard a traditional seagoing vessel.' 6' These
aircraft, therefore, are certainly exposed to the risk and hazards of
the sea. Even if a sufficient maritime nexus is not found, for pur-
poses of the remedies under the law of salvage, aircraft should fall
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court.
The Executive Jet Court seems to have limited its holding to cases
involving aviation tort claims arising from flights by land-based air-
craft between points within the continental United States. 62 Specifically,
the Court concluded that maritime locality alone is not a sufficient
predicate for admiralty jurisdiction in aviation tort cases.' 63 Executive
Jet has been interpreted, however, as an open criticism of the broad
inclusion of aircraft in admiralty law. 64 Martin J. Norris, in his book,
The Law of Salvage, questions whether Executive Jet will mean that
salvage law, as understood by the admiralty courts, cannot be ap-
plied in situations of rescue to fallen land-based aircraft on navigable
waters. Norris believes that so long as the aircraft saved was engaged
156. Barger, 514 F. Supp. at 1208.
157. Id. at 1207.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1207-08.
160. See Times, supra note 5, at Al, col. 2.
161. See Barger, 514 F. Supp. at 1208.
162. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 274.
163. Id. at 261.
164. Note, supra note 134, at 600.
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in commerce and transportation and the salvage service was performed
at a place within admiralty jurisdiction, the admiralty courts "can
and should" grant salvage awards to those who render beneficial ser-
vice to distressed land-based planes.' 65
In a case decided six years after Executive Jet, Mark v. South Con-
tinental Ins. Agency, Inc.,,66 a federal district court held that a land-
based airplane which crashed in navigable waters could be the sub-
ject of salvage under admiralty law. The court, in finding admiralty
jurisdiction, reasoned that the determining factor is whether the ob-
ject salved comes within the category of derelict. A derelict may be
an aircraft that has been abandoned, deserted, or relinquished so that
it may be the basis for an award to the person responsible for saving
it. 67 Regardless of the categorization of the object salved, if the ob-
ject is property that has been salved from navigable waters in which
it was lost, for the benefit of its owner, the admiralty court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter.' 68 The Mark court did not even
consider whether the aircraft had met the maritime nexus require-
ment of Executive Jet in arriving at the decision that admiralty jurisdic-
tion should be obtained.' 69 In light of Mark, Executive Jet can be
interpreted as being limited only to cases involving aviation torts.
The holding in Executive Jet, therefore, is not controlling in deter-
mining admiralty jurisdiction for the purpose of awarding compensa-
tion for salvage services. The preferable approach in determining ad-
miralty jurisdiction over sunken aircraft is the view expressed in Mark,
Maltby, Lambros and Weinstein; that is, the salvage of aircraft lost
at sea should be regulated by the principles of maritime law. These
cases are in accord with the underlying public policy upon which the
maritime law of salvage is founded, that the voluntary rescue of prop-
erty imperiled at sea should be encouraged. Conditioning admiralty
jurisdiction upon the finding of the Executive Jet maritime nexus,
and thus precluding an award for salvage when the maritime nexus
cannot be found, would discourage salvors from voluntarily rescuing
property imperiled at sea.
Clearly, the salvors of the FG-lD Corsair pulled from Lake
Washington would be entitled to seek relief in admiralty court accord-
ing to the principles of maritime law. This relief primarily stems either
165. See Noims, supra note 99, §41, at 3-15.
166. 1978 A.M.C. 519.
167. Id. at 520.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 519.
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from a right to title under the maritime law of finds or a right to
an award for services rendered in the salvage of the aircraft.' 70 For
example, evidence of abandonment may be admitted to justify a grant
of title to the salvor who first reduces the aircraft to possession with
the intent to become the owner.' Alternatively, the salvors may rely
upon a maritime lien to enforce their right to a generous salvage
award.' 72 An overview of the salvage award is necessary to under-
stand the applicability of these remedies to the salvage of sunken
aircraft.
THE SALVOR'S RIGHT TO A SALVAGE AwARD
Salvage is a maritime doctrine and a stranger to terrestrial law.' 73
Under the common law, the passerby who notices an unoccupied
automobile lunging forward down a hill, chases after it, overtakes
it, and brings it safely to rest cannot compel compensation for his
efforts. Furthermore, he cannot retain possession of the car to en-
force his claim; at most, he may recover from the owner of the pro-
perty on a theory of quantum meruit.'74 A volunteer who saves a
vessel from peril, however, obtains an inchoate and secret maritime
lien on the vessel, cargo, and freight money.7 5 Moreover, he may
file his libel for salvage and have a United States Marshal take posses-
sion of the property. A court then may decree the amount of his
interest, and if need be, cause a marshal to sell the property to satisfy
the decree.' 76 Public policy encourages the hardy and adventurous
mariner to render these laborious and sometimes dangerous services. ,77
The doctrine of salvage is based on the notion that a special reward
for voluntary effort in saving property in peril at sea will promote
the orderly organization of reasonable salvage efforts.' 71 Widespread
participation in this maritime practice, moreover, will minimize com-
mercial losses and discourage struggles, theft, and piracy in situations
in which police surveillance is not ordinarily available.' 79 Admiralty
170. See infra notes 173-224 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 174-206 and accompanying text.
173. See Nouus, supra note 99, §12, at 1-17-1-18.
174. The reward for salvage services is usually far more liberal than an allowance of mere
quantum meruit for voluntary work or services. See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240,
267 (U.S. 1804).
175. See NoRms, supra note 99, §12, at 1-17.
176. Id.
177. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1869).
178. The Emulous, 8 Fed. Cas. 706, 707 (C.C.A. Mass. 1832) (No. 4480).
179. Id.
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courts do not view the salvage award solely as compensation under
the principle of quantum meruit, but also as a reward given for perilous
services voluntarily rendered, and as an inducement to mariners to
embark in these dangerous enterprises to save life and property.' 0
Three elements are necessary for a valid salvage claim. These elements,
which must be present in every case, include the following: (1) a marine
peril from which the property could not have been rescued without
the assistance of the salvor, (2) service voluntarily rendered when not
required as an existing duty, and (3) success in whole or part, or
that the service rendered contributed to such success.' 8'
The peril necessary to constitute a salvage service need not be one
of imminent and absolute danger."8 2 The property must be in present
or foreseeable danger."8 3 The degree of the peril, whether slight or
serious, affects the amount of the award, but not the establishment
of the salvage service.'" Marine peril is considered to include more
than the threat of storm, fire, or piracy to a vessel in navigation.'
Aircraft wreckage, however, that has rested on the ocean floor may
still be subjected to marine peril and warrant a salvage service. For
example, continual exposure to the elements over the mere passage
of time has been found sufficient to constitute a marine peril.8 6 In
Treasure Salvors v. Unidentified Wrecked, Etc. (hereinafter referred
to as Treasure Salvors J),187 a seventeenth century Spanish galleon
had lain undisturbed for 350 years beneath the wide shoal west of
the Marquesas Keys. The court found that despite this long period
of time, the vessel was still in peril of being lost through the action
of the elements. The court held that the requirement of marine peril
had been met, and a salvage award could be granted to the salvors
of the sunken vessel.188
The second important element essential to the recognition of a valid
salvage claim is that the service be voluntarily performed by those
under no legal obligation to do so. 8 9 Voluntariness connotes perfor-
180. The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879).
181. Id.
182. See NoRuus, supra note 99, §63, at 5-1.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 5-2.
185. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 337. The peril required need not necessarily be one
of imminent and absolute danger. "The property must be in danger, either presently or reasonably
to be apprehended." Noiuus, supra note 99, §185, at 14-1; see also Fort Myers Shell & Dredg-
ing Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1968).
186. See Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 337.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 337.
189. Nosuus, supra note 99, §68, at 6-1.
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mance under circumstances in which the performer is not legally
obligated to render the act.' 90 This element of voluntariness is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the court in light of all the
circumstances.' 9'
The third element necessary to a valid salvage claim is that the
salvage operation end with success in whole or in part, or that at
least the rendered services must have contributed to the ultimate suc-
cess. If the operation is unsuccessful, the salvor cannot earn any com-
pensation under a salvage award. 92 Success in the rescue of sunken
aircraft can be determined easily. The sunken aircraft must be raised
and brought to shore.
No limitation has been imposed on the type of person who may
be entitled to a salvage award. When property, including an aircraft,
has been abandoned or become derelict, anyone may put himself for-
ward as salvor.' 93 The finder of the aircraft possesses the right to
exclude others from participating in the salvage operations, so long
as the original finder appears ready, willing, and able to complete
the salvage project. 9" The salvor of sunken aircraft may desire title
or ownership of the property.'19 Alternatively, the salvor can seek
a salvage award. The salvage award entitles the salvor to compensa-
tion for services rendered, and also enables the salvor to satisfy his
award with a maritime lien on the aircraft. If the salvor can be en-
joined by the owner from engaging in the salvage services, he may
be precluded from seeking title to, or salvage rights in, the aircraft.
In an ordinary case of disaster, when the master remains in com-
mand, he retains possession of the ship, and has discretion to deter-
mine the amount of assistance that is necessary under the
circumstances.' 96 Moreover, if the master leaves the craft temporarily,
upon his return the salvors are bound to relinquish possession of the
190. Id.
191. Id. at 6-2.
192. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 12.
193. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 195 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Cobb Coin, 525
F. Supp. at 203.
194. Treasure Salvors v. Unidentified Wrecked, Etc., 640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter referred to as Treasure Salvors II]. To ensure the right to exclusive possession,
the finder must exercise an actual taking of the property with the intent to reduce it to posses-
sion. See Eads, 22 Ark. at 512. In Eads, even though the claimant marked trees on the bank
of the river and placed buoys over the wreck, these acts were insufficient to obtain the right
to exclusive possession under the law of salvage. Id. These acts merely indicated a desire or
intent to appropriate the property. Id. If the claimant had placed his boat over the wreck,
with means to raise it, and with persistent efforts to do so, the law would protect these acts
of possession. Id.
195. See infra notes 207-24 and accompanying text.
196. Merrill v. Fisher, 91 N.E. 132, 133 (Mass. 1910).
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ship. 97 The owner of the distressed property, therefore, would be
entitled to control all salvage efforts directed toward the rescue of
his vessel. This fact, in and of itself, could be sufficient to discourage
professional salvors from engaging in the salvage of economically
valuable property sunken at sea. If the property is derelict, however,
the salvors have absolute possession and control of the vessel.' 98 Thus,
once the salvors have commenced their salvage operations, the owner
of an abandoned and derelict airplane may not enjoin the raising of
his aircraft.' 99
As an incentive to encourage persons to assist distressed or en-
dangered property at sea, the maritime law will grant the salvor a
right to a monetary award for his voluntary services.2 0 The perfor-
mance of salvage services gives rise to a maritime lien.20' The salvor
of sunken aircraft may assert a right to a salvage award either in
an in rem proceeding against the salved aircraft, or in an in personam
proceeding against the owner of the salved aircraft. 2 2 Salvage awards
are not limited to a strict quantum meruit measure of the value of
the services performed;20 3 rather, the award for salvage is calculated
to include a bounty or premium based upon the risk involved in the
operation and the skill with which the salvage was performed.2 4 The
Supreme Court has suggested the following criteria for determining
the amount of an appropriate salvage award: (1) the labor expended
by the salvors in rendering the salvage services, (2) the promptness,
skill, and energy displayed in rendering the service and saving the
property, (3) the risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property
from peril, (4) the value of the property saved, (5) the degree of danger
from which the property was rescued, and (6) the value of the prop-
erty employed by the salvors and the danger to which the salvor's
property was exposed.2"5 Once the right to a salvage award has been
determined, the question remains whether the maritime law of finds
supplements the law of salvage and grants the salvor the right to title
197. Id.
198. Id.; see also Howard v. Sharlin, 61 So.2d 181, 181 (Fla. 1952); Baker v. Hoag, 7
N.Y. 555, 559 (1853).
199. This may indicate that the Nav'y cannot enjoin the salvage of the six planes discovered
in the depths of Lake Washington. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
200. Treasure Salvors I, 640 F.2d at 567.
201. Id.; see Noams, supra note 99, §137, at 10-1.
202. See Treasure Salvors II, 640 F.2d at 567.
203. See Crescent Towing & Salvage Co. v. the M.V. 117, 87 F. Supp. 257, 258-59 (E.D.
La. 1949).
204. See NoRuus, supra note 99, §235, at 19-6-19-7.
205. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 13-4.
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and ownership of the recovered aircraft.21 6 Although the salvor may
obtain adequate compensation for his services with a salvage award,
the professional salvor will argue, in the alternative, that the aircraft
is abandoned, and that consequently, he is entitled to ownership of
the property under the maritime law of finds. Some controversy exists,
however, regarding the application of this maritime doctrine.
Tim SALVOR's RIGHT To TITLE UNDER THE
MARITmE LAW OF FINDs
Once admiralty jurisdiction has been established, some dispute re-
mains as to the rights of a party who reduces to possession lost or
abandoned property found at sea.201 At least, the salvor may recover
a salvage award for his meritorious services in the rescue of the im-
periled craft. Norris, in his treatise on the law of salvage, states that
under salvage law, the abandonment of property at sea does not divest
the owner of title.2"8 Norris explains that the word "find" denotes
that the property has never been owned by any person; therefore title
to the property will vest in the finder. 209 In other words, a finder
may only acquire title to things commonly of nature such as wild
animals. If, however, the property was previously possessed by an
individual and subsequently lost or abandoned, the finder is entitled
only to compensation for salvage services, rather than the right to
title.210 A person who voluntarily saves imperiled property on navigable
waters, therefore, does not become the title holder of that property,
but instead saves the property for the benefit of the owner and may
expect only an appropriate salvage award.211
The overwhelming body of case law, however, rejects the theory
that title to abandoned property can never be lost.2" 2 The first case
to reject this theory was Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of
Italian Marble.1 3 In Wiggins, the court reasoned that the cases cited
by Norris in support of his view that title to abandoned wrecks or
206. See Wiggins, 186 F. Supp. 452, 456; see infra notes 207-224 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors 1, 569 F.2d 330, 336 (1978); Wiggins, 186 F. Supp. 452,
456 (1960).
208. NoRmus, supra note 99, §150, at 11-1.
209. Id. §158, at 11-14.
210. Id. §150, at 11-2.
211. Id.
212. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 336; see also Wiggins, 186 F. Supp. at 456; Eads,
22 Ark. at 509; Treasure Salvors 1I, 640 F.2d at 571; Nippon, 238 F. Supp. at 59; Cobb Coin,
525 F. Supp. at 198; Rickard v. Pringle, 293 F. Supp. 981, 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
213. 186 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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cargo is never lost were not controlling. 1 4 Relying upon the land-
mark case of Eads v. Brazelton,1 5 the Wiggins court held that a par-
ty taking possession of a vessel and cargo under salvage operations
may be characterized as a finder acquiring title good against the
owner.2"6
In Eads, a steamboat and cargo had been sunk in the Mississippi
River for thirty years. The owners made no efforts to salvage the
wreck, nor did they attempt any act evidencing an intent to save the
property. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the vessel had been
abandoned, and the finder of the wreck was entitled to the property
as owner."' This view later was affirmed by the United States Court
of Claims in Thompson v. United States.2"' In that case, the iron
tanker Gut Hell collided with two other vessels on April 27, 1913
and sank in the Mississippi River. Several unsuccessful attempts were
made to recover the vessel. On February 3, 1914, the owner notified
the Engineer's Office of the United States Army of his abandonment
of the vessel. 2" The Thompson court concluded that the vessel had
been abandoned.220 The court then held that when a vessel is derelict
22
'
and abandoned in the navigable waters of the United States or
anywhere else, it belongs to the person who finds it and reduces it
to possession.222 Currently, the view that a finder of abandoned pro-
perty at sea acquires title and ownership is widely accepted.223
In summary, prevailing case law indicates that abandoned sunken
aircraft may fit properly under the maritime law of finds. Under the
law of finds, once abandonment occurs, title to the aircraft will vest
in one who discovers the derelict property and reduces it to posses-
214. Id. at 456. The court elaborated by stressing that these cases involve instances in which
the personalty had been separated from the vessel. Id. at 456. See The Akaba, 54 F. 197,
199 (4th Cir. 1893); see also The Bark Cleone, 6 F. 517, 523 (D. Cal. 1881) (the intention
to return to the vessel was apparent); The Port Hunter, 6 F. Supp. 1009, 1010-11 (D. Mass.
1934) (the acts of the owners negated any intent to abandon the vessel).
215. 22 Ark. 499.
216. Wiggins, 186 F. Supp. at 456.
217. Eads, 22 Ark. at 508-09. The court noted, however, that property that is lost involun-
tarily, or left without the hope and expectation of again acquiring it, becomes the property
of the finder subject to the superior right of the owner. Id. at 509. In cases of admiralty,
the finder may hold possession until he is paid his compensation. Id.
218. 62 Ct. Cl. 516.
219. Id. at 517.
220. Id. at 524.
221. Derelict in the maritime sense of the word has been defined as a vessel, cargo, or
other property that is abandoned without hope -of recovery or without intention of returning.
State v. Flying "W", 160 S.E.2d 482, 488 (1968).
222. Thompson, 62 Ct. Cl. at 524.
223. See, e.g., Wiggins, 186 F. Supp. at 456.
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sion. The doctrine of finds provides the most favorable remedy for
the salvor of sunken aircraft. Even if abandonment cannot be shown
to invoke a.grant of title to the sunken aircraft, the salvor may rely
secondarily on the maritime law of salvage to compensate him
generously for his labors. This does not, however, end the inquiry
into a determination of the salvor's rights. If the aircraft is located
within the territorial boundaries of the state, the salvor may encounter
an adversarial claim by the state founded upon statutory rights or
rights inherited from the Crown of England as a prerogative of the
state in its sovereign capacity. For example, in State v. Flying "W"
Enterprises, Inc.,224 the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
sunken vessels abandoned for more than 100 years within the ter-
ritorial limits of the state were within the purview of the common
law and belonged to the state in its sovereign capacity.225
APPLICABILITY OF STATE RIGHTS
Many aircraft have crashed upon, and sunk in, navigable bodies
of water within state boundaries or off coastal waters within the
geographical jurisdiction of the state. Under these circumstances, the
salvor of the sunken aircraft may be faced with adversarial claims
brought by the state, alleging a superior right to title. In Flying "W"
the rights of the State of North Carolina to a derelict sunken vessel
discovered beneath the surface of the ocean within territorial waters
of the state were expressly determined. 26 A salvage crew began con-
ducting diving and salvage operations on a number of Confederate
blockade runners sunk in the coastal waters of North Carolina during
the Civil War, and upon the wreck of a Spanish privateer sunk off
the coast during the first part of the eighteenth century. The State
of North Carolina initiated an action to enjoin the salvors permanently
from proceeding with these activities, and to command them to return
to the state various artifacts of historical significance allegedly taken
from the wrecks by the salvors.227 The State alleged title to the vessel
and cargo on two separate grounds, one based upon state wreck
statutes, 228 the other based upon prerogatives of the British Crown
inherited by the state in its sovereign capacity.22 9
224. 160 S.E.2d 482.
225. Id. at 492.
226. Id. at 482.
227. Id. at 483.
228. Id. at 494.
229. Id. at 492.
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STATUTORY RIGHT TO TITLE-WRECK STATUTES
Many of the coastal states have enacted "wreck" statutes purporting
to grant exclusive title to the state to stranded vessels, cargoes, or
any property cast upon the shore.230 In Flying "W", North Carolina
asserted that the wreck statutes granting exclusive ownership to the
state of any wrecks found within the territorial limits of the state
had application to a sunken vessel and cargo located within a marine
league of the coast.231 The North Carolina Supreme Court held,
however, that these wreck statutes only applied to vessels or their
cargo, or any property that was cast upon the shore. The wreck
statutes, therefore, were inapplicable because the sunken vessel was
located some distance from the shore.23 2
California has enacted wreck statutes similar to those that existed
in North Carolina at the time Flying "W" was decided.233 In a 1956
opinion, the California Attorney General asserted that the state wreck
statute applied only to wrecks "in the old common law sense, i.e.,
vessels stranded on the coast and goods and merchandise which may
be cast by the sea upon the land.123 4 The State of California, therefore,
could not claim title, based upon the wreck statutes, to sunken air-
craft located within the territorial limits of the state. Furthermore,
an attempt to enforce this type of statute might be unconstitutional.
In Wiggins, the court questioned the constitutionality of a statute
that recognized the rights of a state to lay claim to wrecked property. 2"5
The court determined that this type of statute would be opposed to
the policy of maritime law to encourage the recovery of distressed
property by awarding compensation for salvage services.236 In dic-
tum, the court expressed extreme doubt that any statute granting
exclusive state rights to wrecked property could stand constitutional
scrutiny. 237 Unless the wrecked aircraft has been cast ashore, therefore,
the state may not enjoin salvage operations based upon wreck statutes.
230. See, e.g., CAL. HA. & NAY. CODE §§510-522.
231. Flying "W", 160 S.E.2d at 494.
232. Id.
233. Compare CAL. HAR. & NAY. CODE §§510-522 with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§82-1-18 (repeal
ed. by 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 882, §5). Subsequent to the decision of Flying "'," the legislature
in North Carolina enacted statutes that would expressly grant title to the State to property
sunken within a marine league of the state, and would control the disposition of a dispute
similar to that raised in Flying "W". See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§121-22-28.
234. See Sunken Ancient Vessels, 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 4 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Sunken
Vessels].
235. 186 F. Supp. 452, 455 (1960).
236. Id. at 455.
237. Id.
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The State of California has intimated that it may assert exclusive title
to property sunken within state territorial boundaries. 38 An analysis
of the position that California may take is necessary to demonstrate
the salvor's rights to aircraft or other property sunken in this state.
ANTCIPAIMG AN ASSERTION OF SUPERIOR
TITLE BY THE STATE OF CAIFoRNIA
The only recorded incident involving an assertion of title by the
State of California to property abandoned at sea never came to trial,
but was addressed by a 1956 California Attorney General Opinion. 239
A skin diver discovered the remains of a sunken Spanish galleon off
Solana Beach in San Diego County. Officials believed the wreck to
be one of the vessels led by the explorer San Francisco del Ulloa
that sunk in that vicinity in 1541. The wreck was located in approx-
imately sixty feet of water within the three-mile marginal belt off the
coast of California. The skin diver allegedly recovered a massive gold
and sapphire ring from the wreck.24 0 The Attorney General concluded
that title to the wrecked vessel and cargo belonged to the state. 24 1
This opinion was founded upon three separate bases: (1) succession
to the common-law prerogative of the British Crown in derelict prop-
erty, (2) state legislation, and (3) inapplicability of federal admiralty
law.242 Through an analysis of current case law, this outdated opin-
ion can be attacked on all three grounds.
A. Title Under the Sovereign Prerogative
According to the common law of England, under any of the Crown
prerogatives, the sovereign possessed the absolute right to any wrecked
or abandoned property found on the seas. 243 The true owner, however,
could reclaim the property provided he appeared within a year and
a day. 44 Several authorities have adopted the view that the "several
states" inherited, as sovereigns, many of the prerogatives of the Crown
of England, including the right to abandoned property recovered at
sea by British subjects. 45 In Flying "W"," the court held that the
238. See Sunken Vessels, supra note 234, at 2.
239. Id. at 1-2.
240. Id. at 2.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2-6.
243. See "The Aguila," 165 Eng. Repr. 87, 91 (1798).
244. See Flying "W," 160 S.E.2d at 490.
245. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
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state had title to abandoned marine property as an inherent sovereign
prerogative.246
A subsequent court decision, Cobb Coin v. Unidentified Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,2 47 expressly rejected the view of Fly-
ing "'W". 24 8 In that case, the court stated that under the prevailing
American rule regarding ownership of lost or abandoned property,
in the absence of any express statutory claim by the sovereign, aban-
doned property recovered at sea becomes the property of the salvor. 249
The court in Cobb Coin also noted that the view expressed in Flying
"W" has been recognized only in two other American cases,25 0 and
all three cases have been severely criticized in academic literature. 21'
Based upon the preceding discussion, the California courts should not
follow the 1956 Attorney General's opinion that the state possesses
title to the sunken aircraft because of an inherent right as a sovereign
state.
B. Title Under State Legislation
The opinion of the Attorney General also asserted that the state
has jurisdiction to establish the rules by which interests in property
are to be determined. Moreover, the opinion argued that the state
has exercised this jurisdiction by declaring that the title to abandon-
ed or lost property vests in the state.25 2 The opinion relied upon two
very broad statutes that declare: (1) "the state is the owner of all
land below tide-water," '253 and (2) "[a]ll property within the limits
of the state, which does not belong to any person, belongs to the
people.' '2-4 Importantly, the Attorney General claimed that the
authority of the state to determine proprietary rights in abandoned
or lost property was confirmed by Congress in the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953.255
246. Flying "W," 160 S.E.2d at 492.
247. 525 F. Supp. 186 (1981).
248. See id. at 213, n.24.
249. Id. at 213.
250. See Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp. 356, 360
(S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1975); State by and Through
Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902, 907 (Fla. 1957).
251. See Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership of the Treasures of the Sea, 9 WM & MARY
L. REv. 383, 385 (1967-68); Note, Abandoned Property: Title to Treasure Recovered in Florida's
Territorial Waters, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 360, 369 (1969).
252. See Sunken Vessels, supra note 234, at 3.
253. See CAL. CIv. CODE §670.
254. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §'182.
255. See Sunken Vessels, supra note 234, at 3; 43 U.S.C. §§1311(a)-1314(a). Section 1311
provides in part: "[Title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the
boundaries of the respective States ... and the right and power to manage, administer, lease,
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In a case with facts similar to those related in the Attorney General
opinion, the State of Florida, also citing the Submerged Lands Act,
claimed by statute to have plenary authority over sunken artifacts
found within the territorial boundaries of the state.256 The Submerged
Lands Act of 1953 granted the states title to, and ownership of, the
lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of their respec-
tive states.2"7 More specifically, the "paramount rights" of the federal
government to exercise full dominion and power over the lands,
minerals, and other things underlying the ocean were ceded to the
states through the Submerged Lands Act.25 The Fifth Circuit in
Treasure Salvors I, however, has interpreted these "paramount rights"
to pertain only to natural resources, and not to historic wreck sites
discovered on continental shelf land.259 In Cobb Coin, the court
affirmed this interpretation and concluded that the Submerged Lands
Act does not empower the state to lay claim to abandoned wreck
sites within the three mile limit recognized under that Act through
legislation which purports to derogate both federal jurisdiction and
the application of admiralty principles.26 Therefore, based upon the
holdings in Treasure Salvors I and Cobb Coin, California may not
rely on the Submerged Lands Act to assert jurisdiction over sunken
aircraft.
C. Applicability of Admiralty Law
Alternatively, the opinion of the California Attorney General asserted
that the resolution of proprietary disputes over wrecked property is
not subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction. 26' The opinion, therefore,
implied that the disposition of the wrecked property should be con-
trolled by state statutory or common-law principles rather than by
maritime doctrines under admiralty law. This would preclude the salvor
from asserting any rights to title under the law of finds or to an
award under the law of salvage. This author has concluded, however,
that the overwhelming majority of case law suggests that admiralty
jurisdiction is appropriate.262
and develop . . .said lands ... are subject to ...vested in and assigned to the respective
States. . . ." Id. §131(a).
256. See Cobb Coin, 525 F. Supp. at 216.
257. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 145-46 (1965).
258. Cobb Coin, 525 F. Supp. at 215.
259. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 338-40.
260. Cobb Coin, 525 F. Supp. at 215-16.
261. See Sunken Vessels, supra note 234, at 6.
262. See, e.g., Cobb Coin, 525 F. Supp. at 213.
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The Attorney General claimed that even if the sunken vessel were
within admiralty jurisdiction, the eleventh amendment to the United
States Constitution would bar a suit by the skin diver-salvor.2 63 The
eleventh amendment protects the state against unconsented actions in
federal courts brought by citizens of the state or citizens of other
states.26" The Attorney General contended that the eleventh amend-
ment was applicable equally to proceedings in admiralty.2 6s In Cobb
Coin, however, the court recognized that the immunity afforded by
the eleventh amendment clearly extends only to suits in which a plain-
tiff seeks compensatory money damages that would be payable from
the state treasury.266 The skin diver, in contrast, having retrieved the
gold ring, would not be asking the court for an award of compen-
satory monetary damages payable from the state treasury, but instead
would be asking the court to determine either that he owns the ring
as a finder, or that by virtue of his salvage services, he is entitled
to an appropriate salvage award from the state.2 67 The third claim
raised by the Attorney General on behalf of the state, therefore, has
been refuted by the court in Cobb Coin.
Finally, Cobb Coin held that under the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution, article VI, paragraph 2, state legislation
that conflicts with federal maritime principles cannot be given effect.26
The principle that federal maritime law supersedes inconsistent state
law has been followed regularly by the courts.269 Moreover, Cobb
Coin holds that federal salvage law is central to the body of "customs
and ordinances of the sea" and must preempt inconsistent state law.270
The State of California, therefore, cannot contravene established ad-
miralty law by denying the finder of lost, abandoned, and derelict
property at sea his substantive rights under the maritime laws of finds
and salvage. In summary, the outdated California Attorney General
Opinion is without support according to current case law. Based on
the foregoing discussion, salvors can avoid state sovereignty claims
because, as previously established: (1) the prevailing American view
rejects the notion that the states inherited a right to abandoned prop-
erty at sea from the British Crown, (2) the Submerged Lands Act
263. See Sunken Vessels, supra note 234, at 6.
264. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1889).
265. Id.
266. Cobb Coin, 525 F. Supp. at 197.
267. See id.
268. Id. at 201.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 213.
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of 1953 does not empower the states to lay claim to abandoned wreck
sites within their state boundaries, (3) the eleventh amendment does
not protect the state from suits initiated by salvors to obtain a decree
of title or salvage award, and (4) state legislation conflicting with
federal maritime principles cannot be given effect under the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution.
This author has concluded that salvors of sunken aircraft may claim
title to the property under the maritime law of finds, provided that
abandonment is shown,27' or receive a generous salvage award for
the voluntary rescue of property imperiled at sea.272 Moreover, even
if the sunken aircraft is located in navigable waters within the boun-
daries of a state, the salvor can overcome state claims to title of the
aircraft.273 Nonetheless, salvors of sunken aircraft still may face claims
by the federal government based upon rights to title as a sovereign.
Additionally, since most of the demand in "restorable" aircraft is
for vintage military planes, the rights of the federal government as
the original owner must be considered. The following section will
analyze the impact of federal rights upon the salvor's rights in the
sunken aircraft.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RIGHTS TO TITLE
Property not owned by the federal government that is brought to
shore by American citizens may be disposed of by Congress. Legisla-
tion purporting to take control of abandoned property rescued at sea,
however, has never been enacted. If the sunken aircraft was previously
owned by the United States Government, the salvor's rights will be
governed by the traditional maritime doctrines of finds and salvage.
A. Rights to Sunken Aircraft not Owned by the Federal
Government
In Treasure Salvors ,274 the United States Government claimed title
to a sunken vessel discovered by American citizens off the coast of
Florida. 275 Two relevant issues raised by the Government in its claim
to title concerned the Abandoned Property Act 276 and the sovereign
271. See supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 173-206 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 95-172 and accompanying text.
274. 569 F.2d 330 (1978).
275. Id.
276. 40 U.S.C. §310.
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prerogative. 77 The Abandoned Property Act authorizes the Ad-
ministrator of General Services to protect the interest of the govern-
ment in wrecked, abandoned, or derelict property "being within the
jurisdiction of the United States, and which ought to come to the
United States. 278 In Russell v. Proceeds of Forty Bales of Cotton,79
the Government relied upon the Act as statutory authority for a claim
to the proceeds from the sale of goods found derelict at sea.2 18 The
court, however, determined that the Act applied only to property which
should belong to the United States as a result of government par-
ticipation in the Civil War, and not to wreckage of any other kind. 8
Similarly, the court in Treasure Salvors I reasoned that the Act had
no application to a case involving the recovery of a sunken vessel
and cargo lost at sea.28 2 The court noted that while Congress might
have the constitutional power to take control of wrecked and aban-
doned property brought to shore by American citizens, legislation to
that effect had never been enacted.283
In Treasure Salvors I, the Government also claimed the sunken
treasure as a successor to the prerogative rights of the King of
England.28 The court cited several decisions in concluding that the
notion of sovereign prerogative never took root in America.2" In the
absence of any specific legislation to the contrary, the United States
Government does not possess superior rights to abandoned sunken
aircraft brought to its shores by American citizens. A different result,
however, will exist if the sunken aircraft was owned initially by the
United States Government. The following discussion is especially im-
portant to the professional salvor of sunken aircraft since vintage
military planes are high in demand.
B. Ownership Rights to Sunken Aircraft
When the Government stands in the position of an owner of the
sunken aircraft, the doctrines of abandonment and lost property
together with maritime laws of salvage and finds should apply to the
government as they do to private owners. The enormity of the United
277. See supra notes 243-51 and accompanying text.
278. See 40 U.S.C. §310; see also Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 342.
279. 21 Fed. Cas. 42 (S.D. Fla. 1872) (No. 12,154).
280. Id. at 43.
281. Id.
282. Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 342.
283. Id. at 341.
284. Id. at 340.
285. Id. at 342.
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States Government and the inherent administrative complexities re-
quire that for purposes of abandonment and the maritime law of finds,
the evidence of abandonment must be overwhelming.286 Personal prop-
erty under the jurisdiction of the Navy may be disposed of under
the authority contained in the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949.287 With the exception of battleships, carriers,
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, the Act provides that the Navy
may sell or dispose of all of its personal property.288 Although no
provision of the Act expressly provides for the abandonment of govern-
ment property, the Ninth Circuit, in Kern Copters, Inc. v. Allied
Helicopter Service, Inc.,29 held that the abandonment of government
property must be effectuated in the authorized manner.29 In Kern
Copters, a helicopter owned and operated by the United States Govern-
ment crashed in the Guatemalan jungle. The Army attempted to
retrieve certain parts of the aircraft, but made no effort to retrieve
the remainder. 9' A dispute to title arose between a party who had
taken possession of the wreck and a party who subsequently had pur-
chased the wreck from the Government.2 92
Despite the fact that the Army had failed to seek recovery of the
wrecked aircraft for a period of eighteen months, the court held that
abandonment had not been established. 293 Even though the Army did
not have immediate possession of the wreck, the helicopter was under
the control of the Army to the extent that the Army had the power
or authority to manage and administer the property as against all
other parties. 9 The court in Kern Copters pointed out that Congress
has the power to provide for the disposition of property of the United
States.29 1 This power, moreover, must be exercised in the authorized
manner. 296 The authorized manner, in this instance, was governed by
Army regulations, which required affirmative evidence of abandon-
ment pursuant to the regulation. 297 The pertinent regulation provided
that abandonment could be accomplished only by the Army giving
286. See, e.g., Kern Copters, Inc. v. Allied Helicopter Service, Inc., 277 F.2d 308, 308.
287. See 32 C.F.R. 736.1. The intent of Congress in enacting this legislation is to provide
an economical and efficient method for the disposition of government property. 40 U.S.C. §471.
288. See 32 C.F.R. 736.1.
289. 277 F.2d 308.
290. Id. at 313.
291. Id. at 309.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 313.
294. Id. at 311.
295. Id. at 313; see Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 330 (1936).
296. Finsky v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 249 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1957).
297. Kern Copters, 277 F.2d at 313.
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wide public notice of intent to abandon, or by a finding of a board
of officers that abandonment is required by military necessity, con-
siderations of health, safety, and security, or low property value to
the extent that retention is not justified. 298 The court emphasized that
mere inactivity, or neglect, upon the part of the government officers
is insufficient to cause the Government to lose property through
abandonment.299
The court intimated, however, that a presumption of abandonment
was possible on the ground that the Army had a duty to act promptly
and either recover the wreck or abandon it. In this case, because no
effort was made to recover the property promptly, the court presum-
ed that the aircraft was abandoned.300 This presumption of abandon-
ment was based upon the idea that Army officers should do their
duty.30' Since the officers had a duty to abandon the property only
in the authorized manner, failure to recover the wreck indicated that
the helicopter was abandoned.30 2 This presumption was overcome,
however, by contrary evidence of retention introduced by the
government.30 3 Although Kern Copters suggested that the Government
can relinquish ownership of property only by expressly manifesting
an intent to abandon, one reported case held that the Government
had divested itself of ownership by implied conduct evidencing
abandonment.30 4
In 1911, the Navy deliberately sank three battleships in target
practice. Two of the vessels were later sold and removed from
Chesapeake Bay. The San Marcos, however, was not sold and con-
tinued to lie in the same location.30 5 According to federal statute,
the Government as owner of the vessel was required to place buoys
to mark the location of the wreck and commence the immediate
removal of the sunken craft. 30 6 Failure to do so was considered an
abandonment of the craft. 7 Subsequently, the Lexington, a freight
vessel, collided with the wreck and sank alongside the San Marcos.
The owners of the Lexington brought a tort action against the United
States alleging that the Government had not abandoned the vessel
298. Id. at 311.
299. Id. at 313.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Baltimore, Crisfield, Onancock Line, Inc. v. United States, 140 F.2d 230.
305. Id. at 231.
306. 33 U.S.C. §409.
307. Id.
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and remained liable as owner of the craft.30 8 In Baltimore, Crisfield,
Onancock Line, Inc. v. United States,"" the court held, however, that
even though the Government had not taken any positive action by
publishing notice or some similar act, the act of "shooting the bat-
tleship to pieces" and allowing the vessel to sit for twenty-nine years
was sufficient to constitute an abandonment of the craft. 0 In Somerset
Seafood Co. v. United States,31' another vessel collided with the San
Marcos and ran aground. The court affirmed the finding in Baltimore
that sometime prior to the collision of the Lexington in 1940, the
San Marcos had been abandoned by the Government.3 12
According to the Baltimore and Somerset Seafood cases, salvors
who reduce sunken government aircraft to possession, thereafter may
assert title to the property by introducing evidence of relinquishment
and intent to abandon on the part of the Government. After examin-
ing the evidence of abandonment in light of all of the circumstances,
the court will decide whether the Government has divested itself of
ownership of the aircraft. The evidence of abandonment, however,
must be overwhelming before the court will make this finding. Even
in light of Baltimore and Somerset Seafood, a heavy burden is placed
upon the salvor who alleges abandonment by the Government. Even
if abandonment cannot be proven, however, the salvor will be entitled
to a generous salvage award for his services rendered in restoring to the
mainstream of commerce and culture historically invaluable goods left
abandoned to the sea.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the increase in demand for the restoration of vin-
tage aircraft has caused professional salvors to turn to the sea in search
of World War I and II aircraft. The common law establishes that
when personalty has been abandoned, title to the property vests in
the first occupant who, with intent to become the owner, reduces the
property to possession. According to California statutory law, if the
property merely has been lost, rather than abandoned, the finder,
under certain circumstances, may obtain title to the lost goods. The
common-law doctrines of abandonment and lost property, standing
308. Baltimore, 140 F.2d at 234.
309. 140 F.2d 230.
310. Id. at 234.
311. 95 F. Supp. 298 (D. Maryland 1951).
312. Id. at 300.
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alone, provide viable remedies for one who discovers and rescues
sunken aircraft.
By determining, however, that these aircraft through submersion
in navigable waters, become proper subjects under admiralty law,
remedies to the salvor of sunken aircraft are improved substantially.
Under the maritime law of salvage, the salvor is entitled to a reward
for his salvage services, regardless of a determination that the air-
craft.has not been abandoned. If the sunken aircraft can be categorized
as a derelict, the owner may not enjoin the salvage of the property.
Moreover, the salvage award is enforceable by a maritime lien on
the aircraft. Finally, the maritime law of finds may supplement the
law of salvage and grant title to the finder of lost, abandoned, or
derelict aircraft recovered at sea.
This author has demonstrated that the rights to title will withstand
an attack based upon any current state or federal legislation. The
state cannot claim superior title to the sunken aircraft, either under
the wreck statutes or in accordance with any sovereign prerogatives.
The federal government cannot assert superior title under any sovereign
prerogatives, nor has Congress enacted any statute granting the federal
government title to abandoned property brought to American shores.
If the sunken aircraft is military, however, the federal government,
as an owner, possesses superior rights to title, unless it has relinquished
that title by abandoning the property. The policy underlying these
maritime remedies that encourages the rescue of distressed property
at sea is based soundly in admiralty law. The equitable application
of these admiralty doctrines will ensure consistency and promote the
orderly rescue of all property imperiled at sea.
Jeffery J. Crandall
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